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POWER TO THE PEOPLE: THE TENTH 
CIRCUIT AND THE RIGHT OF CITIZENS 
TO SUE FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF  
UNDER SECTION 309(G)(6)(A) OF  
THE CLEAN WATER ACT 
Lisa Donovan*
Abstract: The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit re-
cently determined that the jurisdictional bar contained in section 
309(g)(6)(A) of the Clean Water Act does not preclude citizen plaintiffs 
from seeking equitable relief, but only bars those actions seeking civil 
penalties. However, this holding by the Tenth Circuit in Paper, Allied-
Industrial, Chemical and Energy Workers International Union v. Continental 
Carbon Co. directly conºicts with prior decisions by the First and Eighth 
Circuits. The First and Eight Circuits have broadly interpreted the juris-
dictional bar to preclude citizens from seeking civil penalties or equita-
ble relief once an administrative enforcement action is underway. An 
examination of the relevant statutory language, legislative history, and 
policy rationale, however, reveals that section 309(g)(6)(A) was only in-
tended to bar citizens actions for civil penalties, preserving citizens’ 
powerful role in the protection and restoration of the navigable waters 
of this country. 
Introduction 
 On November 8, 2005, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit handed down a landmark decision in Clean Water Act 
(CWA) litigation, ªnding that the jurisdictional bar contained in sec-
tion 309(g)(6)(A) of the CWA1 only precludes citizens from seeking 
civil penalties when an administrative enforcement action is under-
                                                                                                                      
* Clinical Program Director, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 
2006--07. 
1 To enhance clarity, the text of this Note will refer to CWA section numbers 309 and 
505, as opposed to their codiªed section numbers in the United States Code (§ 1319 and 
§ 1365, respectively). However, the footnotes will cite to the codiªed section numbers in 
the Code. 
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way.2 The Tenth Circuit’s holding in Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical 
and Energy Workers International Union v. Continental Carbon Co. allows 
citizen plaintiffs to seek equitable relief even when claims for civil 
penalties are precluded under section 309(g)(6)(A).3 The Continental 
Carbon decision has contributed to the growing divide among lower 
courts that have attempted to interpret the preclusive effect of  sec-
tion 309(g)(6)(A).4 While some lower courts have construed this ju-
risdictional bar broadly, and as a result have weakened the enforce-
ment power of the CWA, others have interpreted the preclusion 
provision narrowly, preserving the critical role citizen suits play in the 
environmental protection scheme.5
 The Tenth Circuit’s recent decision has made the tension among 
the courts particularly evident, as its holding in Continental Carbon di-
rectly conºicts with previous decisions by the First and Eighth Cir-
cuits.6 Speciªcally, the courts disagree as to which forms of relief are 
precluded from being sought by citizen plaintiffs when an administra-
tive enforcement action is underway.7 The First and Eighth Circuits 
have construed section 309(g)(6)(A) to preclude citizen suits seeking 
civil penalties or equitable relief.8 By contrast, the Tenth Circuit held 
                                                                                                                      
2 Clean Water Act § 309(g)(6)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A) (2000); Paper, Allied–
Indus., Chem. and Energy Workers Int’l Union v. Cont’l Carbon Co., 428 F.3d 1285, 1300 
(10th Cir. 2005). 
3 428 F.3d at 1300. 
4 See, e.g., id. (holding that section 309(g)(6)(A) bars only civil penalty claims and not 
claims seeking equitable relief); Ark. Wildlife Fed’n v. ICI Ams., Inc., 29 F.3d 376 (8th Cir. 
1994) (holding that section 309(g)(6)(A) precludes actions for both civil penalties and 
equitable relief); N. & S. Rivers Watershed Ass’n, Inc. v. Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d 552 (1st 
Cir. 1991) (holding that the section 309(g)(6)(A) ban extends to claims for injunctive 
relief and civil penalties); Coal. for a Liveable W. Side, Inc. v. New York City Dep’t of Envtl. 
Prot., 830 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that section 309(g)(6)(A) only applies to 
civil penalty actions). 
5 See, e.g., Cont’l Carbon, 428 F.3d 1285; Ark. Wildlife Fed’n, 29 F.3d 376; N. & S. Rivers, 
949 F.2d 552; Coal. for a Liveable W. Side, 830 F. Supp. 194; see Patrick S. Cawley, Note, The 
Diminished Need for Citizen Suits to Enforce the Clean Water Act, 25 J. Legis. 181, 184 (1999); 
Mark S. Fisch, Note, The Judiciary Begins to Erect Another Dam Against Citizen Suits Under the 
Clean Water Act, 22 Stetson L. Rev. 209, 211, 225 (1992); Arne R. Leonard, Student Work, 
When Should an Administrative Enforcement Action Preclude a Citizen Suit Under the Clean Water 
Act?, 35 Nat. Resources J. 555, 579–82 (1995). 
6 Compare Cont’l Carbon, 428 F.3d at 1300, with Ark. Wildlife Fed’n, 29 F.3d at 383, and N. 
& S. Rivers, 949 F.2d at 558. This Note will directly analyze this conºict. 
7 Compare Cont’l Carbon, 428 F.3d at 1300, with Ark. Wildlife Fed’n, 29 F.3d at 383, and N. 
& S. Rivers, 949 F.2d at 558. 
8 Ark. Wildlife Fed’n, 29 F.3d at 383; N. & S. Rivers, 949 F.2d at 558. 
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that the section bars only citizen claims for civil penalties, permitting 
subsequent claims brought by citizens seeking equitable relief.9
 The Tenth Circuit’s decision in Continental Carbon comes at a 
time when United States citizens are questioning the government’s 
ability and desire to address a wide range of domestic environmental 
problems.10 Limited resources, state and local economic interests, and 
political agendas have led to relaxed federal and state enforcement of 
many environmental regulations, including the CWA.11 Fortunately, 
while the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and states hold the 
primary enforcement power under the CWA, private citizens have 
ªlled many of the gaps in enforcement by ªling citizen actions to ad-
dress environmental harms.12 Citizens are able to act as a check on 
the government by initiating federal and state enforcement efforts 
and acting as a supplemental enforcement authority when the gov-
ernment fails to act.13
 Unfortunately, despite the documented effectiveness of citizen 
suits, courts have recently narrowed the citizen’s role in enforcing the 
CWA.14 The First and Eighth Circuits have contributed to this erosive 
trend by ªnding that section 309(g)(6)(A) of the CWA precludes citi-
zens from seeking any type of relief when an administrative enforce-
ment action is underway.15 The Tenth Circuit’s recent decision in Con-
tinental Carbon both challenges the First and Eighth Circuit’s broad 
                                                                                                                      
9 Cont’l Carbon, 428 F.3d at 1300. 
10 Peter H. Lehner, The Efªciency of Citizens Suits, 2 Alb. L. Envtl. Outlook 4, 4 
(1995–96); see Steven D. Shermer, The Efªciency of Private Participation in Regulating and 
Enforcing the Federal Pollution Control Laws: A Model for Citizen Involvement, 14 J. Envtl. L. & 
Litig. 461, 477–79 (1999). 
11 Zygmunt J.B. Plater et al., Environmental Law and Policy: Nature, Law, and 
Society 1028, 1034 (2004). Interstate competition for industry and jobs, changes in gov-
ernment administration, and the existence of environmental agencies apathetic to the 
needs of citizens have contributed to ineffective environmental enforcement. Id. 
12 Id.; see David R. Hodas, Enforcement of Environmental Law in a Triangular Federal System: 
Can Three Not Be a Crowd When Enforcement Authority Is Shared by the United States, the States, 
and Their Citizens?, 54 Md. L. Rev. 1555, 1626 (1995); Lehner, supra note 10, at 4–5. 
13 Plater et al., supra note 11, at 1028, 1034; Hodas, supra note 12, at 1618–19. As 
one author articulates: “One of the important lessons citizen suits have taught is that ‘pri-
vate industry, left to its own initiative, will procrastinate indeªnitely, even at the expense of 
the environment, [and] the government agencies empowered with protecting the envi-
ronment are far from diligent in that regard.’” Hodas, supra note 12, at 1621 (quoting 
PIRG v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 720 F. Supp. 1158, 1163 (D.N.J. 1989). 
14 See Gwaltney of Smithªeld, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987); 
Ark. Wildlife Fed’n v. ICI Ams., Inc., 29 F.3d 376 (8th Cir. 1994); N. & S. Rivers Watershed 
Ass’n, Inc. v. Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d 552 (1st Cir. 1991). See also Hodas, supra note 12, at 
1656; Fisch, supra note 5, at 225. 
15 Ark. Wildlife Fed’n, 29 F.3d at 383; N. & S. Rivers, 949 F.2d at 558. 
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interpretation of the section 309(g)(6)(A) bar, and signiªes powerful 
resistance to recent judicial activism that put effective enforcement of 
the CWA in jeopardy.16
 This Note will examine how the Tenth Circuit’s narrow interpre-
tation of section 309(g)(6)(A) of the CWA preserves the public’s vital 
role in enforcing the laws that protect the navigable waters of the na-
tion from polluters and government inaction. Part I explores the role 
that citizen suits have played in the CWA’s enforcement scheme and 
what restrictions have been placed on these suits since their emer-
gence in 1972. Part II reviews the relevant case law regarding the type 
of relief citizens are barred from seeking under section 309(g)(6)(A) 
of the CWA. This section of the Note also highlights the current di-
vide between the First, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits’ interpretation of 
the scope of the jurisdictional bar. Finally, Part III looks to why the 
statutory language, legislative history, and policy rationales of section 
309(g)(6)(A) should persuade the Supreme Court to follow the 
Tenth Circuit’s reasoning and ªnd that the statutory bar only applies 
to citizen claims for civil penalties, not equitable relief. 
I. The Role of Citizen Suits Under the CWA 
 The Tenth Circuit recently preserved a citizen plaintiff’s right to 
sue for declaratory or injunctive relief when the government is engaged 
in an administrative enforcement action.17 There are two types of ad-
ministrative enforcement actions: Administrative compliance orders 
and administrative penalty assessments.18 Administrative compliance 
orders have been criticized as the weakest enforcement mechanism be-
cause they do not impose civil penalties, are only enforceable by a court 
order, are not subject to judicial review, and do not have to adhere to 
public participation requirements.19 Alternatively, administrative pen-
alty assessments recover civil penalties for past violations of the CWA, 
but cannot be used to impose penalties for violations of compliance 
orders or to impose injunctive relief.20 In the Continental Carbon case, 
                                                                                                                      
 
16 See Paper, Allied-Indus., Chem. and Energy Workers Int’l Union v. Cont’l Carbon 
Co., 428 F.3d 1285, 1300 (10th Cir. 2005). 
17Id. 
18 See Leonard, supra note 5, at 584. 
19 Id. at 585–86. 
20 Id. at 586–87. Currently, there is disagreement among courts regarding what types of 
administrative enforcement actions should preclude citizen suits. Id. at 583–93. While this 
debate is beyond the scope of this Note, it is important to state that the Tenth Circuit in 
Continental Carbon did not engage in a discussion regarding what types of administrative 
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the Tenth Circuit construed the jurisdictional bar contained in section 
309(g)(6)(A) to only preclude citizen suits seeking civil penalties when 
an administrative enforcement action is underway.21 However, if this 
case had been tried in the First or Eighth Circuit, a very different result 
would have ensued.22 Both the First and Eighth Circuits would have 
dismissed the entire citizen suit, as those jurisdictions have found that 
section 309(g)(6)(A) of the CWA precludes citizens from seeking both 
civil penalties and equitable relief.23
A. The Emergence of Citizen Suits in Water Pollution Regulation 
 In 1972, Congress passed the Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act Amendments,24 dramatically altering the manner in which the 
federal government controlled the increasingly serious problem of 
water pollution.25 These amendments, most commonly referred to as 
the CWA, became a powerful tool in the preservation and restoration 
of the navigable waters of the United States by establishing efªcient 
and effective enforcement methods that prior water pollution regula-
tions lacked.26 Speciªcally, the CWA authorized EPA to monitor the 
emissions of efºuents into navigable waters by the use of National Pol-
lutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits, which “estab-
lish technology-based limits on the volume and concentration of pol-
lutants that can be discharged into the nation’s waters . . . .”27 Each 
state was also given authority to establish its own permit and enforce-
                                                                                                                      
actions preclude citizen suits. See Cont’l Carbon, 428 F.3d 1285. For a comprehensive analy-
sis of what types of administrative enforcement actions should preclude citizen suits, see 
Leonard, supra note 5, at 583–601. 
21 Cont’l Carbon, 428 F.3d at 1300. 
22 Compare id., with Ark. Wildlife Fed’n v. ICI Ams., Inc., 29 F.3d 376, 383 (8th Cir. 
1994), and N. & S. Rivers Watershed Ass’n, Inc. v. Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d 552, 558 (1st 
Cir. 1991). 
23 See Ark. Wildlife Fed’n, 29 F.3d at 383; N. & S. Rivers, 949 F.2d at 558. 
24 See generally Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codiªed as amended at 33 
U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2000)). 
25 See Hodas, supra note 12, at 1555–56; Frank M. Howard, Note, Citizens For a Better 
Environment v. Union Oil Company of California: Keeping Citizen Suits Alive in the Face of 
Inadequate State Government Enforcement, 27 Golden Gate U.L. Rev. 43, 44–45 (1997); Leo-
nard, supra note 5, at 557–65. 
26 See Hodas, supra note 12, at 1563–71; Fisch, supra note 5, at 212; Howard, supra note 
25, at 44–45; Leonard, supra note 5, at 557–61. 
27 Leonard, supra note 5, at 557; see Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 402, 86 Stat. 850, 880–83 
(1972). 
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ment program, provided that the scheme was deemed compatible 
with the CWA and approved by EPA.28
 To broaden and bolster enforcement of the CWA, enforcement 
power was allocated to the federal government, state governments 
and—for the ªrst time in a water pollution control law—to private citi-
zens of the United States.29 The CWA currently gives private citizens 
“attorney-general” status to act as enforcers of the Act, empowering 
them to seek both monetary penalties and equitable relief from alleged 
violators.30 Citizen suits thus enable the general public to act as enforc-
ers of the CWA when the government has failed to do so, either as a 
result of limited enforcement resources, particular policy objectives, or 
its own laxity.31 For decades, these suits have been a powerful and criti-
cal enforcement mechanism, spurring and supplementing government 
actions and deterring violators from non-compliance.32
1. Statutory Authority for Citizen Suits Under the CWA 
 The statutory authority for citizen suits was built into the 1972 
amendments and lies in section 505 of the CWA.33 This provision al-
lows private citizens to commence an action in federal district court 
against: 
[A]ny person . . . who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an 
efºuent standard or limitation under this chapter or (B) an 
order issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to 
such a standard or limitation, or . . . against the Administra-
tor where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator to 
perform any act or duty under this chapter which is not dis-
cretionary . . . .34
                                                                                                                      
28 Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 402(a)(5), 86 Stat. 850, 880 (1992) (“The Administrator shall 
authorize a State, which he determines has the capability of administering a permit pro-
gram which will carry out the objective of this Act, to issue permits for discharges into the 
navigable water within the jurisdiction of such State”); Hodas, supra note 12, at 1569–70; 
Fisch, supra note 5, at 212–13; Leonard, supra note 5, at 558. 
29 Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 505(a), 86 Stat. 850, 888 (1972) (codiªed as amended at 33 
U.S.C. § 1365(a)); see Hodas, supra note 12, at 1568, 1618; Leonard, supra note 5, at 558. 
30 Plater et al., supra note 11, at 1028, 1034; see Clean Water Act § 505(a), 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1365(a) (2000). 
31 See Plater et al., supra note 11, at 1028, 1033; Hodas, supra note 12, at 1618–23. 
32 S. Rep. No. 99-50, at 28 (1985); Hodas, supra note 12, at 1618–19. 
33 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a). 
34 Id. 
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Thus, section 505(a) allows private citizens to bring actions not only 
against individual or corporate polluters violating the CWA, but also 
against the government when it is either unable to or has refused to 
use its resources to effectively enforce the Act.35 Speciªcally, this pro-
vision permits a federal district court to: (1) enforce the CWA efºuent 
standards and limitations; (2) enforce orders regarding the efºuent 
standards and limitations; (3) order the EPA Administrator to enforce 
the CWA standards and limitations; and (4) apply the proper civil 
penalties for a violation.36
2. Limitations on Citizen Suits 
 Several limitations have been placed on these suits since their 
emergence in the CWA in 1972.37 For instance, a citizen cannot com-
mence an action until a sixty day notice of the alleged violation has 
been given to the EPA Administrator, to the state where the supposed 
violation is taking place, and to the alleged violator of the Act.38 A citi-
zen is also precluded from ªling suit against a polluter if the federal 
or state government has begun “diligently prosecuting a civil or 
criminal action” against the polluter in court “to require compliance 
with the standard, limitation, or order . . . .”39 These limitations re-
emphasize that Congress intended that the primary enforcement au-
thority lies with the government under the CWA, and that citizen suits 
are supplementary.40
B. Expanding the Bar on Citizen Suits 
 In 1987, Congress expanded the limitations on citizen suits 
through the passage of the Water Quality Act of 1987.41 Speciªcally, 
the restrictions arose from the addition of section 309(g) to the CWA, 
establishing a novel administrative procedure for the assessment of 
                                                                                                                      
35 See id. 
36 Id. 
37 See Hodas, supra note 12, at 1626–27; Leonard, supra note 5, at 555–56. 
38 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A) (“No action may be commenced . . . prior to sixty days af-
ter the plaintiff has given notice of the alleged violation (i) to the Administrator, (ii) to the 
State in which the alleged violation occurs, and (iii) to any alleged violator of standard, 
limitation, or order.”). 
39 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B). 
40 See Hodas, supra note 12, at 1626–27. 
41 See Pub. L. No. 100-4, § 314(a), 101 Stat. 7 (1987) (codiªed at 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)); 
Hodas, supra note 12, at 1630; Leonard, supra note 5, at 565, 570–71. 
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civil penalties.42 Section 309(g) authorizes the government to seek 
civil penalties outside of the courtroom for past violations.43 Its addi-
tion to the Act provided a third alternative to the two existing civil 
enforcement mechanisms available under the CWA: (1) a compliance 
order issued under section 309(a); and (2) a judicial civil action seek-
ing monetary penalties and injunctive relief issued under section 
309(b).44 Thus, by authorizing the government to request civil penal-
ties from polluters, section 309(g) gives government ofªcials an op-
portunity for enforcement that “provide[s] greater deterrent value 
than an administrative order for a violation that does not warrant the 
more resource intensive aspects of judicial enforcement.”45
 To safeguard against the possibility that polluters would be subject 
to duplicative administrative civil penalties—ªrst sought for by EPA and 
then again by a citizen enforcement suit—Congress established section 
309(g)(6)(A), which limits citizen action against alleged violators when 
an administrative enforcement action has already commenced and is 
being diligently prosecuted.46 However, courts have been unable to 
agree on the scope of the section 309(g)(6)(A) bar on citizen suits.47 
Some courts have found that the section signiªcantly broadens the pre-
clusion of citizen suits, while others have deªned this bar more nar-
rowly.48
                                                                                                                      
42 See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g); Hodas, supra note 12, at 1630; Leonard, supra note 5, at 565, 
570–71. 
43 See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g); Leonard, supra note 5, at 614. 
44 See S. Rep. No. 99-50, at 26–27 (1985); Leonard, supra note 5, at 565–66. 
45 S. Rep. No. 99-50, at 26. 
46 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A); S. Rep. No. 99-50, at 28. 
47 Compare Paper, Allied-Indus. Chem. & Energy Workers Int’l Union v. Cont’l Carbon 
Co., 428 F.3d 1285, 1300 (10th Cir. 2005), with Ark. Wildlife Fed’n v. ICI Ams., Inc., 29 F.3d 
376, 383 (8th Cir. 1994), and N. & S. Rivers Watershed Ass’n, Inc. v. Town of Scituate, 949 
F.2d 552, 558 (1st Cir. 1991); Leonard, supra note 5, at 583. 
48 Compare Cont’l Carbon, 428 F.3d at 1299–300, and Coal. for a Liveable W. Side, Inc. v. 
New York City Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 830 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), with Ark. Wildlife 
Fed’n, 29 F.3d at 377, 382–83, and N. & S. Rivers, 949 F.2d at 557–58. The debate as to 
whether section 309(g)(6)(A) should be constructed narrowly or broadly extends to the 
interpretation of other aspects of the section. Other issues raised in a typical section 
309(g)(6)(A) analysis include: (1) what types of administrative enforcement actions bar 
citizen suits; (2) how to decide whether administrative enforcement actions deªned under 
state law are comparable to the administrative penalty assessment provision under the 
CWA for the purpose of precluding citizen suits; and (3) how to decide whether a gov-
ernmental agency is engaged in the diligent prosecution of the administrative enforce-
ment action. See Leonard, supra note 5, for a substantive analysis of these issues. 
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1. Statutory Language of Section 309(g)(6)(A) 
 Section 309(g)(6)(A) underlines the restrictions an administra-
tive enforcement action places on other sections of the CWA.49 Courts 
that narrowly interpret section 309(g)(6)(A) place substantial weight 
on the plain meaning of the statutory language to support only ex-
tending the bar to citizen claims for civil penalties.50 By contrast, 
courts that broadly interpret the bar disregard the statute’s plain lan-
guage and dismiss citizen suits seeking either civil penalties or equita-
ble relief.51 Under section 309(g)(6)(A), any CWA violation: 
(i) with respect to which the [EPA]Administrator or the Sec-
retary has commenced and is diligently prosecuting an ac-
tion under this subsection, 
(ii) with respect to which a State has commenced and is dili-
gently prosecuting an action under a State law comparable 
to this subsection, or 
(iii) for which the Administrator, the Secretary, or the State 
has issued a ªnal order not subject to further judicial review 
and the violator has paid a penalty assessed under this subsec-
tion, or such comparable State law. . . . shall not be the subject 
of a civil penalty action under subsection . . . [505] of this ti-
tle.52
2. Legislative History of Section 309(g) 
 Before passing section 309(g), Congress noted the importance of 
citizen actions, calling the suits “proven enforcement tool[s]” that have 
acted to “both spur and supplement . . . government enforcement ac-
tions . . . [and] have deterred violators and achieved signiªcant compli-
ance gains.”53 Congress intended for § 309(g) to “[strike] a balance be-
tween two competing concerns: The need to avoid placing obstacles in 
the path of such citizen suits and the desire to avoid subjecting violators 
of the law to dual enforcement actions or penalties for the same viola-
tion.”54 Furthermore, Congress was clear in its intent to apply the limita-
                                                                                                                      
49 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A). 
50 See Cont’l Carbon, 428 F.3d at 1297–98; Coal. for a Liveable W. Side, 830 F. Supp. at 196–
97. 
51 See Ark. Wildlife Fed’n, 29 F.3d at 383; N. & S. Rivers, 949 F.2d at 558. 
52 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A) (emphasis added). 
53 S. Rep. No. 99-50, at 28 (1985). 
54 Id. 
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tion contained in section 309(g) “only to an action for civil penalties for 
the same violations which [were already] the subject of the administra-
tive civil penalties proceeding.”55 Congress explicitly pronounced that 
this bar did not apply to “an action seeking relief other than civil penal-
ties (e.g., an injunction or declaratory judgment).”56 While the legisla-
tive history of section 309(g) suggests a congressional intent to preserve 
citizen claims for equitable relief under section 309(g)(6)(A), the First 
and Eighth Circuits have ignored the history’s signiªcance in interpret-
ing this section of the CWA.57
II. The Scope of Section 309(g)(6)(a): Does the Bar on Citizen 
Suits Extend to Equitable Relief? 
 The Tenth Circuit recently held that the jurisdictional bar on citi-
zen suits contained in section 309(g)(6)(A) applies only to those ac-
tions seeking civil penalties.58 This is contrary to decisions made over 
a decade ago by the First and Eighth Circuits, which found that sec-
tion 309(g)(6)(A) precluded citizens from seeking both civil penalties 
and equitable relief once an administrative enforcement action had 
been commenced and diligently prosecuted.59 While several district 
court decisions refused to apply the First and Eighth Circuits’ broad 
jurisdictional bar to citizen suits,60 the Tenth Circuit is the ªrst federal 
court of appeals to challenge the decisions of these courts.61
A. Supreme Court Precedent: The Gwaltney Decision 
 While the United States Supreme Court has yet to rule on whether 
§ 309(g)(6)(A) precludes private citizens from seeking equitable re-
lief, lower courts have relied on the Court’s language in Gwaltney of 
Smithªeld, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. to determine the in-
tended scope of the bar.62 In Gwaltney, the Court held that section 
                                                                                                                      
55 Id. 
56 See H.R. Rep. No. 99-1004, at 133 (1986) (Conf. Rep.). 
57 Ark. Wildlife Fed’n v. ICI Ams., Inc., 29 F.3d 376, 382–83 (8th Cir. 1994); N. & S. 
Rivers Watershed Ass’n, Inc. v. Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d 552, 557–58 (1st Cir. 1991). 
58 Paper, Allied-Indus., Chem. and Energy Workers Int’l Union v. Cont’l Carbon Co., 
428 F.3d 1285, 1300 (10th Cir. 2005). 
59 Ark. Wildlife Fed’n, 29 F.3d at 383; N. & S. Rivers, 949 F.2d at 558. 
60 See, e.g., Cal. Sportªshing Prot. Alliance v. City of W. Sacramento, 905 F. Supp. 792, 
806–07 (E.D. Cal. 1995); Coal. for a Liveable W. Side, Inc. v. New York City Dep’t of Envtl. 
Prot., 830 F. Supp. 194, 196–97 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
61 See Cont’l Carbon, 428 F.3d at 1300. 
62 See 484 U.S. 49 (1987); Cont’l Carbon, 428 F.3d at 1298–99; Ark. Wildlife Fed’n, 29 F.3d 
at 383; N. & S. Rivers, 949 F.2d at 555, 558. 
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505(a) of the CWA did not confer federal jurisdiction over citizen 
suits for wholly past violations of the Act.63 However, lower courts are 
divided in their interpretation of the Supreme Court’s language and 
holding in Gwaltney.64 Consequently, the decision has been used by 
courts to both extend and narrow the preclusive effect of section 
309(g)(6)(A) on citizen suits.65
 Courts sympathetic to defendants and hostile to citizen suits have 
construed Gwaltney to support the view that once an administrative 
enforcement action has been commenced and diligently prosecuted, 
a citizen is precluded from seeking any type of relief for the same vio-
lation in court.66 The First and Eighth Circuits have used certain lan-
guage from Gwaltney to maintain this argument.67 The First Circuit 
explained: 
The statutory language suggesting a link between civilian 
penalty and injunctive actions, considered in light of the 
Gwaltney opinion’s language outlining the supplemental role 
the citizen’s suit is intended to play in enforcement actions, 
leads us to believe that the section 309(g) bar extends to all 
citizen actions brought under section 505, not merely civil 
penalties.68
 By contrast, courts recognizing the critical role citizen suits play in 
the enforcement of the CWA use Gwaltney to narrowly construe the 
preclusive effect of section 309(g)(6)(A).69 In Gwaltney, the Court em-
phasized that “the starting point for interpreting a statute is the lan-
guage of the statute itself.”70 The Tenth Circuit followed this directive, 
stressing that the plain meaning of the statutory language suggests that 
only citizen civil penalty claims should be dismissed when an adminis-
                                                                                                                      
63 Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 59. 
64 Compare Cont’l Carbon, 428 F.3d at 1298–99, with Ark. Wildlife Fed’n, 29 F.3d at 383, 
and N. & S. Rivers, 949 F.2d at 555, 558. 
65 See Cont’l Carbon, 428 F.3d at 1298–99; Ark. Wildlife Fed’n, 29 F.3d at 383; N. & S. Riv-
ers, 949 F.2d at 555, 558. 
66 See Ark. Wildlife Fed’n, 29 F.3d at 383; N. & S. Rivers, 949 F.2d at 555, 558. 
67See, e.g., N. & S. Rivers, 949 F.2d at 555 (“It follows that ‘the citizen suit [under sec-
tion 505] is meant to supplement rather than to supplant governmental [enforcement] 
action.’”) (quoting Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 60). 
68 Id. at 558. 
69 See, e.g., Cont’l Carbon, 428 F.3d at 1298–99; Coal. for a Liveable W. Side, Inc. v. New 
York City Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 830 F. Supp. 194, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
70 Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 56 (quoting Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, 
Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)). 
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trative enforcement action is underway.71 In addition, legal scholars 
have noted that Gwaltney should not be an overriding source of author-
ity in deªning the scope of the bar since the Court “relied almost en-
tirely on the legislative history of the 1972 amendments to support its 
suggestion regarding the supplementary role of citizen suits in the 
CWA enforcement scheme.”72 Because the administrative penalty as-
sessment provisions are the product of the 1987 CWA amendments, 
scholars suggest that the “legislative history of the 1987 amendments is 
more germane to the interpretation of these provisions than the gen-
eral precautionary statements regarding the role of citizen suits ex-
pressed in the legislative history of the 1972 amendments.”73
B. The Beginning of the Debate: North and South Rivers Watershed 
Association, Inc. v. Town of Scituate 
 In 1989, the First Circuit deªned the scope of the section 
309(g)(6)(A) bar, holding in North & South Rivers Watershed Ass’n, Inc. 
v. Town of Scituate that a citizen plaintiff is precluded from seeking civil 
penalties or equitable relief when an administrative enforcement ac-
tion is being pursued by the government for the same violation.74 In 
North & South Rivers, a citizen group ªled suit against the town for vio-
lating the federal CWA and sought both civil penalties and equitable 
relief in district court.75 The citizen complaint speciªcally alleged that 
a sewage treatment center was illegally discharging pollutants into a 
coastal estuary.76 Two years earlier the Massachusetts Department of 
Environmental Protection (DEP) issued an administrative order to 
the town of Scituate in response to these violations, requesting that 
the town: (1) cease to establish any further connections to its sewage 
system; (2) take the necessary steps to create new wastewater treat-
ment facilities; and (3) begin upgrading the current treatment cen-
ter.77
 The DEP never assessed any civil or criminal penalties against the 
town, nor did they establish a timetable or deadline against which 
compliance could be measured.78 Thus, even though the state order 
                                                                                                                      
71 See Cont’l Carbon, 428 F.3d at 1298–1300. 
72 Leonard, supra note 5, at 590. 
73 Id. 
74 949 F.2d 552, 558 (1st Cir. 1991). 
75 Id. at 554. 
76 Id. at 553. 
77 Id. at 553–54. 
78 See id. at 554, 554 n.1; Fisch, supra note 5, at 221. 
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attempted to address the noncompliance, the town was still in viola-
tion of the same state laws two years later.79 Despite the town’s disre-
gard for the administrative order and its continuous violation of the 
CWA, the district court granted the town’s motion for summary 
judgment, dismissing the plaintiff’s claim.80 The court found that the 
appellants’ citizen suit (seeking both civil penalties and equitable re-
lief) was barred under section 309(g)(6)(A)(ii) because the state had 
commenced and was in the process of diligently prosecuting the ac-
tion under state law comparable to the CWA.81
 The First Circuit afªrmed the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment.82 After ªnding that the Massachusetts state law was compa-
rable to the CWA and was being diligently enforced by the state, the 
court applied the bar under section 309(g)(6)(A)(ii) to both the civil 
and equitable remedies sought by the plaintiff.83 The First Circuit 
found that “both the policy considerations regarding civilian actions 
under section 505 emphasized by both the Supreme Court and Con-
gress and the fact that section 505 fails to differentiate civilian penalty 
actions from other forms of civilian relief,” supported the broad scope 
of the citizen suit preclusion.84
 Speciªcally, the First Circuit found that the citizen suit provision 
purposefully did not distinguish civil penalty actions from other citi-
zen actions, such as those seeking declaratory or injunctive relief.85 
The court referenced the Supreme Court’s acknowledgment in 
Gwaltney that civil penalties and injunctive relief are referred to in the 
same sentence of the same section of the CWA.86 The First Circuit 
thus found that since most other sections of the CWA addressed dis-
tinct types of relief in separate subsections, the structure of section 
505 suggests that citizen actions for civil penalties and equitable relief 
are intimately connected.87 Consequently, the court assumed that any 
limitation placed on one type of relief must also be placed on the 
other.88 Therefore, the court found that because section 
                                                                                                                      
79 See N. & S. Rivers, 949 F.2d. at 554–55. 
80 See id. at 555. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 558. 
83 Id. at 553, 558. 
84 Id. at 557. 
85 N. & S. Rivers, 949 F.2d at 557–58. 
86 Id. at 558. 
87 See id. 
88 See id.; Leonard, supra note 5, at 612. 
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309(g)(6)(A) precludes citizens from seeking civil penalties, such 
preclusion must also extend to those suits seeking equitable relief.89
 The First Circuit also relied on the Supreme Court’s discussion in 
Gwaltney concerning the supplemental role citizen suits should play in 
the CWA enforcement scheme.90 The Supreme Court’s pronouncement 
that “the citizen suit is meant to supplement rather than to supplant 
governmental action”91 was relied on by the First Circuit in support of 
the proposition that section 309(g)(6)(A) precludes all citizen suits, not 
just those seeking civil penalties.92 The First Circuit stressed that: 
Both the Congress and the Supreme Court have recognized: 
(1) that the primary responsibility for enforcement of Clean 
Water Acts rests with the government; (2) that citizen suits 
are intended to supplement rather than supplant this pri-
mary responsibility; and (3) that citizen suits are only proper 
if the government fails to exercise its enforcement responsi-
bility.93
The court in North & South Rivers believed that once the government 
takes any action to ensure compliance, any subsequent action by citi-
zens will not only fail, but will impede the process necessary to further 
the goals of the CWA.94 In its ªnal words, the First Circuit commented 
on the absurdity of applying the literal interpretation of the statute.95 
By construing section 309(g)(6)(A) broadly, the court “provide[d] an 
alternative meaning” of the section that it believed “avoid[ed] irra-
tional consequences.”96
C. Following the First Circuit’s Lead: Arkansas Wildlife Federation v. ICI 
Americas, Inc. 
 A few years after the First Circuit decided North & South Rivers, 
the Eighth Circuit in Arkansas Wildlife Federation v. ICI Americas, Inc. 
was faced with the same legal issue: Are citizen suits seeking injunctive 
                                                                                                                      
89 See N. & S. Rivers, 949 F.2d at 558; Leonard, supra note 5, at 612. 
90 See N. & S. Rivers, 949 F.2d at 555, 558; see Gwaltney of Smithªeld, Ltd., v. Chesa-
peake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 60 (1987). 
91 Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 60. 
92 N. & S. Rivers, 949 F.2d at 555, 558. 
93 Id. at 558. 
94 See id. 
95 Id. (“Where literal interpretation of a statute would lead to an absurd result, the 
Court must strive to provide an alternative meaning that avoids the irrational conse-
quences.”). 
96 Id. 
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or declaratory relief precluded under section 309(g)(6)(A).97 The 
district court granted summary judgment in favor of ICI Americas, 
Inc. (ICI), dismissing Arkansas Wildlife Federation’s claims for in-
junctive and declaratory relief sought pursuant to section 505(a) of 
the CWA.98 The Eighth Circuit, in afªrming the district court’s opin-
ion, held in part that the bar on citizen suits contained in section 
309(g)(6)(A)(ii) applied to both civil penalty actions and equitable 
relief.99
 In Arkansas Wildlife Federation, ICI operated a herbicide manufac-
turing plant that violated the emissions limits of their NPDES per-
mit.100 After an investigation, the Arkansas Department of Pollution 
Control and Ecology (PCE) entered a Consent Administrative Order 
with ICI requiring compliance with the issued NPDES permit.101 
However, after the Order was continually ignored by both PCE and 
ICI, the Arkansas Wildlife Federation ªled a citizen suit.102
 The Eighth Circuit followed the reasoning set forth by ICI 
(whose reliance centered on the North & South Rivers and Gwaltney 
decisions) in deciding that the district court properly dismissed the 
citizen plaintiff’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief.103 How-
ever, the Eighth Circuit did distinguish itself from the First Circuit by 
stating that its decision “do[es] not go so far as to say that it would be 
‘absurd’ to preclude citizens’ claims for civil penalties without also 
precluding claims for declaratory and injunctive relief under the 
same circumstances.”104 Yet, instead of straying further from the rea-
soning set forth in North & South Rivers, the Eighth Circuit voiced its 
agreement with the First Circuit’s decision that it would be “unrea-
sonable” to bar citizens from seeking civil penalties and not also bar 
them from seeking equitable relief under section 309(g)(6)(A).105 
The Eighth Circuit concluded that allowing citizens to seek equitable 
relief after a state has begun its diligent administrative enforcement 
efforts “could result in undue interference with, or unnecessary du-
                                                                                                                      
97 See Ark. Wildlife Fed’n v. ICI Ams., Inc., 29 F.3d 376, 377 (8th Cir. 1994). 
98 Id. at 379. 
99 Id. at 383. 
100 Id. at 377. 
101 Id. at 378. 
102 Id. 
103 Ark. Wildlife Fed’n, 29 F.3d at 382–83; see Gwaltney of Smithªeld, Ltd., v. Chesapeake 
Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987); N. & S. Rivers Watershed Ass’n, Inc. v. Town of Scitu-
ate, 949 F.2d 552 (1st Cir. 1991). 
104 Ark. Wildlife Fed’n, 29 F.3d at 383 (quoting N. & S. Rivers, 949 F.2d at 558). 
105 Id. 
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plication of, the legitimate efforts of the state agency . . . [and] would 
undermine, rather than promote, the goals of the CWA . . . .”106
D. A Building Block for the Tenth Circuit: Coalition for a  
Liveable West Side, Inc. v. New York City Department  
of Environmental Protection 
 While the Tenth Circuit was the ªrst federal appellate court to 
diverge from the First and Eighth Circuits in deªning the scope of the 
bar on citizen suits under section 309(g), several district courts chal-
lenged the two circuits long before the issue was addressed in Conti-
nental Carbon.107 In Coalition for a Liveable West Side, Inc. v. New York City 
Department of Environmental Protection, the Southern District of New 
York narrowly deªned the scope of the jurisdictional bar on citizen 
suits under section 309(g)(6)(A).108 In that case, a citizen suit was 
ªled by various environmental organizations against the New York 
City Department of Environmental Protection (NYC DEP) for violat-
ing permits for two wastewater treatment plants.109 The citizen suit 
sought to enjoin the NYC DEP from allowing any additional sewer 
connections or sewer ºows to be made into either wastewater plant 
unless certain speciªed conditions were met.110
 In Coalition for a Liveable West Side, the NYC DEP relied on North 
& South Rivers to support its position that the citizen plaintiff was 
barred from bringing any type of enforcement action under section 
309(g)(6)(A).111 However, the district court found that the language 
of the statute unquestionably applied the bar only to civil penalties.112 
According to the court, the language of the section “ensures that an 
entity that has violated the CWA will not be subject to duplicative civil 
penalties for the same violations.”113 The court believed that by giving 
deference to the government action but not completely dismissing 
the citizen suit, a defendant could be certain that he or she would not 
                                                                                                                      
106 Id. 
107 See, e.g., Cal. Sportªshing Prot. Alliance v. City of W. Sacramento, 905 F. Supp. 792, 
806–07 (E.D. Cal. 1995); Coal. for a Liveable W. Side, Inc. v. New York City Dep’t of Envtl. 
Prot., 830 F. Supp. 194, 196–97 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
108 830 F. Supp. at 197. 
109 Id. at 195–96. 
110 Id. at 196. 
111 Id. at 196–97. 
112 Id. (“The language of § 1319 is clear and unambiguous. Its bar applies only to civil 
penalty  actions”). 
113 Id. at 197. 
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be subjected to duplicative or inconsistent equitable remedies.114 The 
reasoning set forth in Coalition for a Liveable West Side continues to be 
used by those courts in favor of preserving the critical enforcement 
power of citizen suits.115
E. Narrowing the Bar: Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical and Energy 
Workers International Union v. Continental Carbon Company 
 The Tenth Circuit’s recent decision in Continental Carbon has 
brought the question of what form of relief citizens are barred from 
seeking under section 309(g)(6)(A) one step closer to being ad-
dressed by the United States Supreme Court.116 The Tenth Circuit 
preserved the citizen plaintiff’s right to seek equitable relief in the 
face of an administrative enforcement action by holding that the ju-
risdictional bar under section 309(g)(6)(A) precludes only civil pen-
alty claims.117
 In this case, Continental Carbon Company (CCC) was a manu-
facturer of carbon black, a material used in making rubber and plastic 
products.118 The CCC plant was located in Ponca City, Oklahoma and 
produced wastewater that was subsequently discharged into “retention 
lagoons” in close proximity to the Arkansas River.119 In 1998, CCC suc-
cessfully obtained a permit from the Oklahoma Department of Envi-
ronmental Quality (ODEQ), allowing the plant to lawfully discharge 
its wastewater into the lagoons.120 However, in 2002, concerns arose 
regarding the manner in which wastewater from the plant was being 
disposed.121 CCC’s employee union, Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemi-
cal and Energy Workers International Union (PACE), along with the 
Native American Ponca Tribe residing in the area, articulated con-
cerns to the ODEQ that CCC’s discharge activities were exceeding the 
permitted area.122 The Ponca Tribe was particularly concerned be-
                                                                                                                      
114 Coal. for a Liveable W. Side, 830 F. Supp. at 197. 
115 See, e.g., Paper, Allied Indus., Chem. and Energy Workers Int’l Union v. Cont’l Car-
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122 See Cont’l Carbon, 428 F.3d at 1289; Brief of Plaintiff–Appellant at 4–5, Paper, Allied-
Indus., Chemical and Energy Workers Int’l Union, and the Ponca Tribe v. Cont’l Carbon 
Company, No. 02-1677 (10th Cir. Apr. 5, 2004). 
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cause members of the tribe swam, ªshed, and hunted in the immedi-
ate area being contaminated by the illegal discharge from the 
plant.123 The Ponca Tribe also obtained their drinking water from a 
well system they owned in the polluted area.124 Their concern led to 
the eventual issuance of a citizen complaint by PACE and the Ponca 
Tribe, which alleged that CCC was discharging industrial wastewater 
unlawfully into marshland east of the lagoons in even closer proximity 
to the Arkansas River.125
 An investigation by ODEQ veriªed the complaint.126 ODEQ ob-
served that the water in the marshland in question was black.127 Fur-
thermore, oily substances were discovered on the surface of the 
marshland that had identical components to those chemicals found in 
the plant’s wastewater.128 After the ODEQ issued a Notice of Violation 
(NOV) informing the plant of its regulatory violations, the agency 
and CCC entered into a consent decree entailing a promise by CCC 
to take certain remedial measures.129 CCC agreed to: (1) conduct a 
permeability study; (2) submit a water balance report; (3) perform an 
approved Supplemental Environmental Project (SEP); and (4) moni-
tor emissions from the plant.130 Several months after the agreement 
was ªnalized, a discrepancy in CCC’s 1998 discharge permit applica-
tion was discovered by ODEQ.131 The discrepancy regarded the 
“depth-to-groundwater” measurement reported in CCC’s permit ap-
plication.132 CCC had reported the depth between the wastewater im-
poundments and groundwater impoundments to be eighty feet.133 
However, after examining data related to other water wells in the re-
gion, ODEQ believed the depth between the two impoundments was 
actually less than ªfteen feet.134 Such a low level of depth between the 
wastewater and groundwater impoundments was a violation of Okla-
homa law.135 Despite this violation of Oklahoma’s water pollution 
regulations, ODEQ and CCC agreed to settle the discrepancy through 
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the permit renewal process.136 In June, 2005, ODEQ renewed CCC’s 
discharge permit through May 31, 2010.137
 On June 19, 2002, after PACE and the Ponca Tribe were deprived 
of relevant information regarding the current state of CCC’s viola-
tions and turned away from meetings with both the company and 
ODEQ, the citizen plaintiffs served a notice of intent to sue upon the 
U.S. Attorney General, EPA, the State of Oklahoma, and CCC.138 On 
November 26, 2002, the plaintiffs ªled a citizen suit against CCC un-
der section 505(a) of the CWA.139 The complaint alleged three claims: 
“(1) unauthorized discharges of wastewater; (2) misrepresentation of 
facts in the 1998 permit application; and (3) failure to report unau-
thorized discharge in the lagoons, including but not limited to the 
discharges identiªed in Claim 1.”140 Plaintiffs sought both monetary 
and equitable damages from CCC.141 Speciªcally, the plaintiffs re-
quested: (1) a declaratory judgment stating that the company violated 
both the CWA and Oklahoma statutes through the unsafe operation 
of its plant; (2) the maximum amount of civil penalties authorized by 
the CWA; and (3) an injunction imposing a compliance schedule on 
CCC and prohibiting all discharges not permitted under the CWA 
and Oklahoma law.142
 In response to the citizen suit, CCC ªled a motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim and lack of jurisdiction.143 CCC’s motion to dis-
miss based on lack of jurisdiction triggered the district court’s analysis 
of the scope of section 309(g)(6)(A) of the CWA.144 The court ªrst 
ruled that the section applied to the citizen action because the Okla-
homa law was comparable to the CWA.145 Next, the district court held 
that section 309(g)(6)(A) precluded only civil penalties from being 
sought by citizens.146 Consequently, the court granted CCC’s motion to 
dismiss for the civil penalty claim, but left the citizens’ claims seeking 
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injunctive and declaratory relief intact.147 Because the district court 
realized its decision had “waded into uncharted waters” on several is-
sues, it stayed its order and allowed CCC to petition for interlocutory 
appeal, which the Tenth Circuit subsequently granted.148
 On interlocutory appeal, the Tenth Circuit afªrmed the district 
court’s decision that the citizen plaintiffs were only precluded from 
seeking civil penalties because the jurisdictional bar under section 
309(g)(6)(A) does not extend to claims for equitable relief.149 The 
court explained that “[d]espite the fact that two other circuit courts 
have considered and rejected the district court’s view [that the bar 
only applies to civil penalties and not equitable relief], our reading of 
the statutory language and relevant precedent persuades us that the 
district court’s conclusion is correct.”150 Because the lower court’s de-
cision was grounded in the statutory language of the CWA, reºected 
the legislative history of the Act, and led to a rational outcome, the 
Tenth Circuit refused to rule in accordance with the First and Eighth 
Circuits’ broad interpretation of section 309(g)(6)(A).151
1. Supreme Court Precedent: Gwaltney from Another Angle 
 While the Tenth Circuit cited to the Supreme Court’s Gwaltney 
decision, it challenged the manner in which CCC and the First and 
Eighth Circuits used the case to broadly construe the section 
309(g)(6)(A) bar on citizen suits.152 Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit 
disagreed with CCC’s view that Gwaltney stands for the proposition 
that civil penalties and injunctive remedies are “inextricably inter-
twined.”153 The Tenth Circuit explained that the Supreme Court’s 
ruling that citizens can only seek civil penalties for a CWA violation if 
they also seek injunctive relief was held to purposefully eliminate citi-
zen recovery of penalties for wholly past violations.154 The court 
viewed the Gwaltney holding as the mirror image of the matter with 
which it was grappling: whether citizens can seek injunctive or other 
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151 Cont’l Carbon, 428 F.3d at 1300. 
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153 Id. at 1299. 
154 Id. at 1298–99; see Gwaltney of Smithªeld, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 
U.S. 49, 58–59 (1987). 
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forms of equitable relief without seeking civil penalties.155 The Tenth 
Circuit found that the policy rationale motivating the Gwaltney deci-
sion was not relevant to the issue of whether citizens are barred from 
seeking civil penalties and equitable relief under section 
309(g)(6)(A).156 The court found that civil penalties and equitable 
relief are not “inextricably intertwined” as CCC argued because a citi-
zen action seeking injunctive relief is never based on a wholly past vio-
lation.157 Thus, the Tenth Circuit also found the First and Eighth Cir-
cuits’ reliance on Gwaltney’s holding and analysis in determining the 
scope of section 309(g)(6)(A) to be improper.158
2. Statutory Language 
 The Tenth Circuit offered the statutory language of the CWA as 
powerful support that Congress did not intend for equitable remedies 
to be excluded under section 309(g)(6)(A).159 The court scrutinized 
both section 505(a) and section 309(g) of the CWA before coming to 
the conclusion that the jurisdictional bar on citizen suits contained in 
section 309(g)(6)(A) applies only to civil penalties, not equitable re-
lief.160 The court ªrst highlighted that section 505(a) gives citizens 
authorization to “commence a civil action” against a violator of the 
CWA and grants the district court jurisdiction “to enforce such an ef-
ºuent standard or limitation . . . and to apply any appropriate civil 
penalties under § [309](d) . . . .”161 The court contrasted section 
505(a) with section 309(g)(6)(A), which states that a violation “shall 
not be the subject of a civil penalty action under . . . section [505] of 
this title” if a state “has commenced and is diligently prosecuting an 
action” with respect to that same violation under the CWA or a com-
parable state law.162
 The Tenth Circuit emphasized a subtle but meaningful differ-
ence in word choice made by Congress in these two sections, noting 
the use of the term “civil action” in section 505(a) and the term “civil 
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penalty action” in section 309(g)(6)(A).163 According to the court, 
“Congress chose to use the words ‘civil action’ in § [505] authorizing 
citizen suits but chose the narrower term ‘civil penalty action’ in the 
§ [309] exclusion from the § [505] grant.”164 The Tenth Circuit found 
that this word choice purposefully clariªed that civil penalties are dis-
tinct from other remedies available under the CWA.165 The Tenth Cir-
cuit stated: 
Congress explicitly grants jurisdiction to “enforce” an efºu-
ent standard of limitation (by presumably issuing a declara-
tory judgment or an injunction) and to “apply any appropri-
ate civil penalties” (by assessing the appropriate ªne). A 
strict reading of the statute, then, indicates that while 
§ [505] grants jurisdiction over all types of civil remedies, the 
limitation in § [309] only strips jurisdiction with regard to 
the district court’s ability to impose civil penalties.166
 To give additional support to this statutory interpretation, the 
Tenth Circuit pointed out that there is a wholly separate provision of 
the CWA used to bar injunctive remedies from being sought by citi-
zens.167 The court noted that section 505(b)(1)(B) explicitly limits 
any private action from being ªled by citizens when a “State has com-
menced and is diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a 
court of . . . a State to require compliance with the standard.”168 The 
court in Continental Carbon referred to the resulting statutory effect as 
a “two-tiered claim preclusion scheme.”169 Accordingly, the “broadest 
preclusion exists when a state commences and diligently prosecutes a 
court action to enforce the standard.”170 The court found that when 
this occurs, section 505(b)(1)(B) is triggered, limiting all types of ac-
tion commenced by a citizen.171 The second tier of preclusion, or 
what the court termed as “narrower preclusion,” exists when the state 
commences an action that is less than judicial enforcement, such as 
an administrative enforcement action.172 The court found that when 
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an administrative enforcement action is commenced by citizens, sec-
tion 309(g)(6)(A) “speciªcally excludes civil penalties from the scope 
of permissible private enforcement remedies, but does not preclude 
other equitable relief.”173
3. Legislative History 
 The Tenth Circuit also found that when examined alongside the 
statutory language, the legislative history of the 1987 amendments 
demonstrates that Congress contemplated and intended precluding 
only civil penalties from being sought when a state has commenced 
and is diligently prosecuting the same violation under comparable 
state law.174 The court emphasized that the House Conference Com-
mittee Report states that: 
No one may bring an action or recover civil penalties under 
section . . . [505] for any violation with respect to which the 
Administrator has commenced and is diligently prosecuting 
an administrative civil penalty action. . . . [T]his limitation 
would not apply to 1) an action seeking relief other than civil 
penalties (e.g., an injunction or declaratory judgment).175
The Tenth Circuit found that this language evinces congressional in-
tent that courts narrowly construe the section 309(g)(6)(A) bar.176
4. Policy Rationale 
 Lastly, the Tenth Circuit articulated its disagreement with the North 
& South Rivers court’s reasoning that applying the literal statutory in-
terpretation of section 309(g) would lead to an “inconceivable re-
sult.”177 The court determined that the rationale behind the section’s 
implementation—to avoid duplicative monetary penalties for the same 
violation—is satisªed without barring citizens from seeking equitable 
remedies.178 The court found that no duplicative civil penalties or equi-
table relief can be sought when a judicial proceeding was underway 
because section 505(b)(1)(B) precludes all private suits from being 
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commenced.179 Similarly, no duplicative equitable or civil remedies will 
be issued under section 309(g)(6)(A) because the section explicitly 
bars citizens from seeking civil penalties and a court could stay a citizen 
action that it found to be duplicative of the administrative enforcement 
action.180 The Tenth Circuit thus found the result of applying the literal 
statutory interpretation of the section anything but “inconceivable.”181 
Rather, the inadequacy of certain state measures to prevent or stop pol-
lution and the inability of pure monetary penalties to always ensure 
compliance led the Tenth Circuit to believe that its interpretation of 
section 309 would promote a rational and desirable result.182
III. Statutory Language, Legislative History, and Policy 
Rationales: Why Citizens Are Not Precluded from Seeking 
Injunctive Relief Under Section 309(g)(6)(A) of the CWA 
 Section 309(g)(6)(A) of the CWA has sparked controversy 
among the circuits on a host of questions: What types of enforcement 
actions preclude citizen suits; which is the proper test for “compara-
bility;” how to deªne “diligent prosecution;” and, most recently, what 
forms of relief can be sought by citizen plaintiffs when an administra-
tive enforcement action is underway.183 The current trend of the 
courts has been to restrict the citizen’s role in water pollution regula-
tion with the hope of restoring greater enforcement authority to the 
government.184 While there are many reasons why this trend is peril-
ous and unsound,185 there is only one way to put an end to it. The 
U.S. Supreme Court must take the opportunity to analyze, clarify, and 
apply section 309(g) of the CWA in the manner that the statutory lan-
guage, legislative history, and policy rationales have directed. Even 
though the scope of section 309(g)(6)(A)’s bar on citizen suits may 
only be one of the many issues the Supreme Court rules on in a given 
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case, the re-establishment of a liberal interpretation of citizen stand-
ing under the CWA is not only correct under the statute, but critical 
to preserve the health and well-being of the citizens of this country.186
 Several district court opinions and legal scholars have disputed 
the First and Eighth Circuits’ decisions to preclude citizens from ªling 
suit for civil penalties or equitable relief when an administrative en-
forcement action is being pursued by a government agency.187 The 
Tenth Circuit, however, is the ªrst federal court of appeals to voice its 
opinion on the issue, agreeing with many lower courts and scholars 
that section 309(g)(6)(A) only bars citizen claims for civil penalties.188 
An examination of the relevant statutory language, legislative history, 
and policy rationales strongly suggests that section 309(g)(6)(A) was 
never intended to bar citizens from seeking equitable relief.189 Fur-
thermore, in applying the First and Eighth Circuits’ analysis to the 
factual situation in Continental Carbon, it becomes clear that barring 
citizens from seeking equitable relief under section 309(g)(6)(A) 
would lead to a large gap in CWA enforcement that could have devas-
tating effects on communities across the country.190 With the Tenth 
Circuit’s clear deviation from the other two circuit courts, the issue is 
now ripe for Supreme Court adjudication.191 The Court should follow 
the lead of the Tenth Circuit and hold that when an administrative 
enforcement action is underway, section 309(g)(6)(A) only precludes 
citizen claims for civil penalties, leaving citizen plaintiffs free to seek 
equitable relief.192
A. Shooting Down Structural Variation in Favor of Statutory Language and 
Legislative History 
 The Tenth Circuit’s view that section 309(g)(6)(A) only pre-
cludes citizens from seeking civil penalties in a subsequent action di-
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rectly conºicts with the First and Eighth Circuits’ ªndings that the 
section bars citizen plaintiffs from seeking either civil penalties or eq-
uitable relief.193 While the First and Eighth Circuits mustered support 
for their position from the existing structural variations between the 
citizen suit provision of the CWA and other sections of the Act, the 
Tenth Circuit provided a compelling justiªcation that the correct 
statutory analysis of section 309(g)(6)(A) should center on the plain 
language and legislative history of the statute.194
 The First and Eighth Circuits rested, in large part, on the fact 
that the Supreme Court in Gwaltney of Smithªeld, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay 
Foundation, Inc. explicitly acknowledged the citizen suit provision’s 
structural composition.195 In Gwaltney, the Court speciªcally noted 
that section 505 of the CWA does not differentiate between civil pen-
alty actions and actions for injunctive relief, but “rather, the two forms 
of relief are referred to in the same section, even in the same sen-
tence.”196 The First and Eighth Circuits argued that because injunc-
tive relief and civil penalties are so intimately united in the citizen suit 
provision—unlike in most other provisions of the CWA—Congress 
must have intended that both forms of relief be barred from being 
sought by citizens under section 309(g)(6)(A).197 Thus, the two cir-
cuit courts extended the signiªcance of section 505’s structural com-
position to any provision of the CWA that involves citizen suits.198 The 
circuit courts made this extension despite the fact that civil penalties 
and injunctive relief are addressed in an entirely separate section of 
the administrative penalties provision of the Act (i.e., section 
309(g)).199
 While the First and Eighth Circuits’ statutory structural analysis 
was not entirely misguided, the courts plainly ignored the guidelines 
set forth in Gwaltney concerning the appropriate manner in which to 
interpret a statutory provision of the CWA.200 The Supreme Court 
emphasized in Gwaltney that “it is well settled that ‘the starting point for 
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194 See Clean Water Act § 309(g)(6)(A), 33 U.S.C. §1319(g)(6)(A) (2000). Compare 
Cont’l Carbon, 428 F.3d at 1298–1300, with Ark. Wildlife Fed’n, 29 F.3d at 382–83, and N. & S. 
Rivers, 949 F.2d at 558. 
195 Ark. Wildlife Fed’n, 29 F.3d at 382–83; N. & S. Rivers, 949 F.2d at 558. 
196 Gwaltney of Smithªeld, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 58 (1987). 
197 Ark. Wildlife Fed’n, 29 F.3d at 383; N. & S. Rivers, 949 F.2d at 558; see 33 U.S.C. 
§§ 1319(g)(6)(A), 1365(a); see Leonard, supra note 5, at 611–12. 
198 Ark. Wildlife Fed’n, 29 F.3d at 383; N. & S. Rivers, 949 F.2d at 558. 
199 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(g)(6)(A), 1365(a). 
200 See Leonard, supra note 5, at 612. 
2007] Citizen Suits for Equitable Relief Under the CWA 169 
interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself.’”201 The two 
circuits even acknowledged their dismissal of the plain language of 
the statute in favor of an interpretation that sharply contrasted with 
the language’s literal meaning.202 The First Circuit attempted to ra-
tionalize its decision by stating that the literal interpretation of the 
section would lead the court to an “inconceivable result.”203 Similarly, 
the Eighth Circuit argued that applying the literal meaning would 
lead to an “unreasonable” outcome.204
 The Tenth Circuit, on the other hand, properly focused on the 
plain language of the statute throughout its entire analysis.205 Section 
309(g)(6)(A) of the CWA states that when an administrative enforce-
ment action is commenced and diligently prosecuted under the Act, 
the violations “shall not be the subject of a civil penalty action under . . . 
section [505] of this title.”206 There is no reference in section 309(g)(6) 
to extending the bar to suits seeking injunctive, declaratory, or any 
other type of relief.207 If Congress intended the bar on citizen suits to 
extend to forms of equitable relief, it surely would have phrased the 
wording of the section differently.208 However, instead of replacing the 
words “civil penalty” with the term “civil action” or the phrase “civil 
penalty or equitable relief,” Congress purposefully barred citizens from 
seeking only a “civil penalty” under section 309(g)(6)(A) of the CWA.209 
In ªnding that the bar extended to those suits seeking civil penalties or 
equitable relief, the North & South Rivers court thus impermissibly re-
drafted an unambiguous statute.210
 The Tenth Circuit also offered the legislative history of the 1987 
amendments to provide additional support for its decision to narrowly 
construe the bar.211 The legislative history demonstrates that Congress 
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intended the section 309(g)(6)(A) bar on citizen suits to extend only to 
citizen claims for civil penalties, not equitable relief.212 In drafting the 
1987 amendments, Congress emphasized the importance of citizen 
suits in the enforcement of the CWA, stating that citizen suits “are a 
proven enforcement tool” that “have deterred violators and achieved 
signiªcant compliance gains.”213 Furthermore, in structuring section 
309(g), Congress explicitly contemplated the “need to avoid placing 
obstacles in the path of such citizen suits.”214 Keeping this concern in 
mind, the Conference Committee directed that the “limitation would 
not apply to [a citizen] action seeking relief other than civil penalties 
(e.g., an injunction or declaratory judgment).”215 The statutory lan-
guage, coupled with the legislative history, thus demonstrates Con-
gress’s clear intent to deªne the bar narrowly, making it extremely dif-
ªcult for the First and Eighth Circuits to judiciously reach the decisions 
they did.216 When given the opportunity, the Supreme Court should 
draw on the Tenth Circuit’s statutory analysis of section 309(g)(6)(A), 
weighing heavily the plain language and legislative history of the sec-
tion to conclude that only citizen claims for civil penalties are subject to 
the bar.217
B. Policy Rationales Behind Section 309(g)(6)(A) Are Not Frustrated by 
Narrowly Construing the Bar on Citizen Suits 
 The First Circuit in North & South Rivers avoided using the plain 
language and legislative history to construe section 309(g)(6)(A) by 
arguing that the “literal interpretation . . . would lead to an absurd 
result.”218 The First Circuit searched for an alternative interpretation 
of the section that would prevent “irrational consequence[s].”219 The 
court feared that a literal reading of the section would strip the gov-
ernment of its primary enforcement authority when a citizen suit 
sought relief beyond civil penalties.220 It stressed that the policy ra-
tionale designating the government as the primary enforcer of the 
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CWA is not constrained to such limited circumstances.221 While the 
Eighth Circuit did not go as far as to say that applying the plain lan-
guage of the statute would be “absurd,” it agreed that a literal inter-
pretation would lead to an “unreasonable” outcome, as it would cause 
“undue interference with, or unnecessary duplication of, the legiti-
mate efforts of the state agency.”222
 It is clear that citizen suits were designed to supplement govern-
ment enforcement efforts.223 It is also clear that one of the underlying 
policy rationales for barring certain citizen actions under section 
309(g)(6)(A) focuses on the prevention of unfairly burdening viola-
tors of the CWA with duplicative penalties for the same violation.224 
However, the First and Eighth Circuits incorrectly used these policy 
rationales to excuse themselves from performing the proper statutory 
analysis of section 309(g)(6)(A).225
 First, the legislative history of the 1987 amendments shows that 
the government’s ability to assess administrative civil penalties under 
section 309(g) was “designed to address past, rather than continuing, 
violations of the Act.”226 However, the only instance in which a citizen 
plaintiff would seek injunctive relief is when there is an ongoing viola-
tion of the CWA that the citizen desires to stop from continuing in the 
future.227 Because a citizen suit seeking injunctive relief is not address-
ing a purely past violation, the Tenth Circuit was correct in ªnding 
that the section 309(g)(6) bar—purposefully designed to prevent du-
plicative penalties from being sought by citizens suing over past viola-
tions—only applies to civil penalty claims that can properly address 
past violations.228
 Furthermore, the First and Eighth Circuits’ argument that apply-
ing the literal meaning of the statute would improperly strip the gov-
ernment of its primary enforcement authority is ºawed.229 The two 
courts emphasize that the government, not citizens, have the primary 
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responsibility to carry out Congress’s intent and to prevent duplica-
tive penalties.230 The circuits are correct that citizen suits were de-
signed by Congress to be a gap ªller where the government was un-
able to carry out its enforcement duties.231 However, categorically 
banning all citizen suits when an administrative enforcement action is 
underway does not prevent the government from exercising its pri-
mary enforcement authority.232 This is because the government can 
remain the primary enforcer of the CWA even when a citizen suit for 
equitable relief is allowed to proceed in the face of an ongoing ad-
ministrative enforcement action.233
 In applying the section 309(g)(6)(A) citizen suit bar only to civil 
penalty actions, the only instance in which the government may not 
have complete control over enforcement of the CWA occurs when a 
state is “pursuing something less than judicial enforcement” and the 
citizen plaintiff is “pursuing an injunction in federal court.”234 How-
ever, even in the rare instance when injunctive relief is sought by the 
state agency in an administrative compliance action and simultane-
ously by a citizen plaintiff in federal court, the government does not 
automatically lose its position as the “primary enforcer” of the 
CWA.235 As the district court in Coalition for a Liveable West Side, Inc. v. 
New York City Department of Environmental Protection noted, a court has 
the ability to “manage the action so as to ensure the diligently pur-
sued state enforcement action will dominate and the city will not be 
whipsawed by multiple actions.”236 For example, a court could decide 
to “stay the citizen action while [the agency] demonstrate[s] that the 
State is indeed diligently prosecuting its action and seeking adequate 
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relief.”237 If the state is found to be seeking and achieving adequate 
compliance gains, the government’s primary enforcement authority 
would be preserved and the citizen plaintiffs would be able to con-
serve their resources.238 On the other hand, if the government’s ef-
forts are found to be inadequate to achieve proper compliance with 
the CWA or comparable state law, the citizen plaintiffs would be al-
lowed to resume their suit for equitable relief, resting assured that 
their efforts would not  usurp the authority of the government or be 
duplicative in nature.239
 Accordingly, the First and Eighth Circuits improperly ignored the 
plain language and the legislative history in interpreting the scope of 
section 309(g)(6)(A).240 Allowing citizens to seek equitable relief under 
section 309(g)(6)(A) does not force the government to give up its role 
as the primary enforcer of the CWA, nor does it take away the govern-
ment’s ability to prevent duplicative penalties for past violations of the 
Act.241 Hence, when given the chance, the Supreme Court should cast 
aside the idea that using the legislative history and plain language of 
section 309(g)(6)(A) to deªne the scope of the section would lead to 
an “absurd” or “unreasonable” outcome, and instead apply the proper 
statutory construction that narrowly restricts citizen actions.242
C. Continental Carbon from Another Angle: Why the First and Eighth 
Circuits’ View of the Section 309(g)(6)(A) Citizen Suit Preclusion  
Frustrates the Goals of the CWA 
 If the Tenth Circuit had followed the First and Eighth Circuits’ 
reasoning in Continental Carbon, both the citizen plaintiffs’ civil pen-
alty claim and claims for injunctive and declaratory relief would have 
been dismissed.243 Furthermore, a large gap in CWA enforcement 
would have been left unªlled.244 When the facts of Continental Carbon 
are closely considered under the First and Eighth Circuits’ analysis of 
section 309(g)(6)(A), the CWA not only fails in its mission to restore 
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and preserve the navigable waters of this country, but innocent peo-
ple fall victim to the economic and political choices of a state author-
ity that overlooks the health and safety of an entire community.245
 In performing this analysis, it is important to remember that even 
though there were two citizen plaintiffs in Continental Carbon—the em-
ployee union (PACE) and the Ponca Tribe—it was the Ponca Tribe that 
had the potential to be gravely affected by Continental Carbon Com-
pany’s (CCC) continued violations of the CWA.246 The Ponca Tribe 
swam, ªshed, and hunted in the contaminated area.247 The Tribe also 
received their drinking water from a well system in the polluted re-
gion.248 Complaints by the two citizen plaintiffs led to the Oklahoma 
Department of Environmental Quality’s (ODEQ) discovery of hazard-
ous black water and oily substances on the surface of marshland outside 
CCC’s permitted discharge area.249 Once the contamination was con-
ªrmed to be a product of CCC’s wastewater discharge, ODEQ took sev-
eral response measures.250 The state agency ªrst issued a notice of vio-
lation (NOV) to CCC.251 The NOV cited three violations and also 
noted that monetary penalties could be assessed up to $10,000 per day 
per violation (even though no penalties were ever sought by the 
agency).252 Next, ODEQ entered into a consent decree with CCC, re-
quiring the company to take several remedial measures.253 However, 
ODEQ did not require these remedial measures to be taken with re-
spect to the retention lagoon largely responsible for the contamination, 
nor did it require CCC to pay any penalties.254
 A few months later, a misrepresentation in CCC’s discharge per-
mit application was discovered.255 Speciªcally, the plant reported the 
depth between the wastewater impoundments and the groundwater 
underneath the impoundment at a level of eighty feet.256 Other data, 
however, suggested to ODEQ that the depth to ground water level was 
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at most ªfteen feet: a direct violation of the state water pollution law.257 
Again, after sending CCC an NOV highlighting the violations, the 
agency only required the plant to modify its permit before extending 
it for another ªve years.258
 Had the Tenth Circuit followed the First and Eighth Circuits’ rea-
soning in the Continental Carbon case, the citizen plaintiffs’ claims for 
declaratory and injunctive relief would have been precluded because 
ODEQ was found to be diligently prosecuting an administrative en-
forcement action under state law.259 However, because ODEQ on its 
own did not order CCC to abide by a strict compliance schedule, did 
not assess civil penalties, and barely even addressed the discharge and 
groundwater violations, it may have been years before CCC took suit-
able action to resolve the contamination problem.260 Because the gov-
ernment did not have the time, resources, or desire to bring an action 
into federal court, it resorted to weak administrative enforcement 
measures instead.261 If this case had been tried in the First or Eighth 
Circuits, the citizen plaintiffs would have been barred from seeking 
injunctive relief under section 309(g)(6)(A) and innocent people 
would have been forced to continue to suffer the long term effects of 
pollution.262 Without citizen action, it appears that ODEQ would have 
allowed CCC to continue its unlawful and hazardous waste discharge 
practices indeªnitely.263 As a result, members of the Ponca Tribe 
would have continued to swim in industrial waste, would have eaten 
contaminated ªsh and animals, and would have cooked with and 
drank contaminated groundwater.264
 Utilizing the broad rule enunciated in North & South Rivers and 
Arkansas Wildlife Federation prevents courts from looking at the facts of 
a case to determine what measures may still need to be taken despite 
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a state’s administrative enforcement action.265 The Tenth Circuit, in 
Continental Carbon, recognized Congress’s concern over duplicative 
penalties and took that concern into consideration when dismissing 
the civil penalty claim and deciding not to dismiss the claims for equi-
table relief.266 The citizen plaintiffs in Continental Carbon did not think 
ODEQ’s steps to achieve compliance with the CWA and Oklahoma 
water pollution laws were enough to protect the health and safety of 
their community.267 The citizens wanted the contamination to cease 
and believed the measures ODEQ was taking would not achieve such 
a goal.268 While ODEQ’s enforcement efforts may have been similar 
to other state enforcement efforts under the CWA, this does not mean 
that citizens should be left to suffer at the hands of a government’s 
economic or political agenda.269 As one legal scholar discovered, state 
agencies regularly ignore discharge violations, treat reporting viola-
tions as insigniªcant and not worthy of enforcement efforts, and limit 
enforcement actions to sending violators letters of NOV or making 
phone calls.270 Citizen suits were included in the CWA to resolve this 
very issue: to achieve compliance with the statute when the govern-
ment is unable to do so because of a lack or resources or concern.271 
The Supreme Court should clarify that section 309(g)(6)(A) only pre-
vents citizens from seeking civil penalties when an administrative en-
forcement action is being pursued.272 This should be done before 
more courts follow the ºawed analysis of the First and Eight Circuits 
and frustrate the purposes of the CWA by leaving a gap in enforce-
ment that endangers the environment and human lives.273
Conclusion 
 The First and Eighth Circuits’ broad interpretation of the juris-
dictional bar contained in section 309(g)(6)(A) precludes citizens 
from seeking civil penalties or equitable relief when an administrative 
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enforcement action is being pursued.274 However, these circuit courts 
improperly ignore the statutory language, legislative history, and pol-
icy rationales behind the section in reaching their decisions.275 Until 
the Tenth Circuit’s recent holding in Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical 
and Energy Workers International Union v. Continental Carbon Co., only 
district courts and legal scholars disputed the First and Eighth Cir-
cuits’ view that citizens are precluded from seeking equitable relief 
under section 309(g)(6)(A).276 The Tenth Circuit’s decision that an 
administrative enforcement action only bars citizens from seeking 
civil penalties under section 309(g)(6)(A) not only leaves citizens free 
to seek injunctive or declaratory relief in subsequent suits, but also 
reafªrms the critical role citizen suits play in the CWA enforcement 
scheme.277
 The Tenth Circuit’s recent decision in Continental Carbon provides 
hope that the trend toward narrowing the private citizen’s role in wa-
ter pollution regulation may be curbed, or at least addressed in the 
near future by the U.S. Supreme Court.278 Section 309(g)(6)(A) of 
the CWA was designed to protect alleged violators from being subject 
to duplicative penalties and to preserve the government’s primary 
enforcement authority under the Act.279 The section was not designed 
to frustrate the purposes of the CWA by forcing citizens to stand help-
lessly by while lax and ineffective administrative enforcement meas-
ures are pursued by the government.280 Since 1972, citizen suits have 
been an integral part of the CWA, and the Supreme Court should fol-
low the Tenth Circuit’s lead to assure that citizens retain a powerful 
tool to preserve and restore the navigable waters of this nation.281
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